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LIABILITY OF AN AGENT IN TORT.
By WAwmN A. SEAVEY.*
"Every one, whether principal or agent, is responsible
directly to persons injured by his own negligence in fulfilling
obligations resting upon him in his individual capacity and
which the law imposes upon him independent of contract. No
man increases or diminishes his obligations to strangers by be-
coming an agent. * * * An agent is not responsible to
third persons for any negligence in the performance of duties
devolving upon him purely from his agency, since he cannot, as
agent, be subject to any obligation towards third persons other
than those of his principal. Those duties are not imposed upon
him by law. He has agreed with no one except his principal to
perform them. In failing to do so he wrongs no one but his
principal, who alone can hold him responsible."
This language, used in Delaney vs. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann.
1123 (1882), has been quoted so frequently with approval by the
courts of this country that it may fairly be said to represent
the typical judicial attitude. Though spoken by the court of a
jurisdiction in which the law is, in part, based upon the Code
Napoleon, it was uttered as an expression of common law prin-
ciples, upon which the decision rested. As used, it applied
to the liability of an agent in charge of real estate, who had
failed to repair the premises, in consequence of which, through
the fall of the gallery upon which he was standing, the plaintiff
was injured. Although the language was not necessary to a
decision of the case, both because the plaintiff was a trespasser
and because it was not shown that the defendant had been
directed by his principal to make repairs, it was the ratio
decidendi. And, although the application of the principle to
the general situation in the case, i. e., where an agent has
charge of property, has been denied by a number of the courts,
there has been no noticeable dissent upon the correctness of the
maxim-like phrase that the agent "neither increases nor dimin-
*Professor of Law in Tulane University.
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ishes his obligations to strangers by becoming an agent." The
purpose of this paper is to discuss the correctness of this.
ONE DOES NOT DIMINISH HIS OBLIGATIONS TO STRANGERS BY BECOM-
ING AN AGENT.
Upon this portion of the phrase, we need spend little time.
There is no common law principle which exempts one from the
consequences of his acts because of the command of another, at
least unless there are present some elements of physical compul-
sion.1 It is n'ecessary then, to consider only a few cases, which
have at times been thought near the line of non-liability. The
cases dealing with conversion, trespass, deceit, and defamation,
are too plain to need comment.
Where there aie physical injuries flowing directly from an
aflirmative act, there is no question to-day but that the agent is
personally liable to the.one injured. The cases of this sort are
numerous and varied. Thus an agent placing property in. a
place where he should know it would be a source of danger to
others is liable.2 It is likewise immaterial whether one in con-
trol of a moving train approaching a crossing without ringing
the bell is an employee or the owner of the road.3 It would
seem to be true also that where a manager directs a servant into
a place which he should have known to be dangerous, he is
liable because of a direct obligation, as the one in command,
1 Cf. Pollock, Torts, Ninth Eng. Ed. p. 179. The rule excusing a sailor
when he obeys reasonable commands of his captain exists because of the
quasi judicial position of the commander of a ship.
Hukill vs. Ry., 72 red. R. 745 (1896); Ellis vs. McNaughton, 76
Mich. 237, 42 N. W. R. 1113 (1889), defective walk; Dudley vs. Ill. Cent.
Ry., 25 Ky. L. B. 1059, 96 S. W. R. 835 (1906); Englert vs. N. 0. By.
& Lt. Co., 128 La. 473, 54 So. B. 963 (1911); Jackson vs. Schmidt, 14 La
Ann. 806 (1859), agent demolishing house failed to give warning to those
passing.
3 Southern Ry. vs. Grizzle, 124 Ga. 735, 53 S. E. R. 244 (1906);
Hough vs. Ill. Cent. Ry., 149 N. W. R. 885 (Ia., 1914); Il. Cent. Ry. vs
Coley, 121 Ky. 385, 89 S. W. R. 234 (1905). But see Erwin vs. Davenport, 9
Heisk 44 (1871), 'where the court held that an engineer running a train
inattentively and with lack of caution was not liable to plaintiff whom the
train injured, holding the neglectfulness to be nonfeasance.
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not to injure others,' and aside from the obligation of the
employer to provide a safe place for employees. 5 He has caused
the employee to enter a dangerous place and produced the
result as surely as a conductor or train-dispatcher who has
given the wrong order.'
'The occasional slip of a court into error, through taking too
seriously for modern times the identity of principal and agent,
may be disregarded.' But there are a few eases in which a
limitation is suggested which should not be allowed to remain.
In Kentucky employees using appliances known to them to be
defective are excused as to co-employees if using appliances as
4 Breen vs. Field, 157 Mass. 277, 31 N. E. R. 1075 (1892); Jackson
vs. Orth Lumber Co., 121 Minn. 461, 141 N. W. R. 518 (1913); Gennaux
vs. N. W. In. Co., 72 Wash. 268, 130 Pac. R. 495 (1913) ; Greenberg vs. Whit-
comb Lumber Co., 90 Wis. 225, 63 N. W. R. 93 (1895); see also Hagerty
vs. Montana Purchasing Co., 38 Mont. 69, 98 Pac. R. 643 (1908); and the
discussion in the Appollo (1891), A. C. 499 and the Rhosina (1884), L. R.
10 Prob. Div. 24. Contra: Steinhouse vs. Spraul, 127 Mo. 541, 28 S .W. R.
630 (1894); Burns vs. Petheal, 27 N. Y. Supp. 499 (1894); Moyse vs.
N. P. Ry., 108 Pac. R. 1062 (Mont., 1910). In O'Neil vs. Young & Sons,
58 Mo. App. 628 (1894), the court held that there was no obligation un-
less the manager know of the danger.
I The liability attaches where there is no relation of service between
the one representing the safety of the place and the one hurt: Necker vs.
Harvey, 49 Mich. 517, 14 N. W. R. 503 (1883).
6 Louisville & N. Ry[ vs. Gollihur, 40 Ind. App. 480, 82 N. E. R. 492
(1907); Morrison vs. N. P. Ry., 34.Wash. 70, 74 Pac. R. 1064 (1904).
7 It may be doubted that the judges of .past centuries would have
held liable the agent of a bailee who negligently lost bailed goods. It was
said obiter in Savage vs. Walthew, 11 Mod. 135 (1707), and in Cavenaugh
vs. Such, 1 Price 328 (1815), that he would be liable only in case of con-
version. No action would lie against him on the contract of carriage, but
the rule to-day is, of course, to hold the agent liable for negligencu: Sehlos-
ser vs. G. N. Ry., 20 S. D. 406, 127 N. W. R. 502 (1910).
In Cheatham vs. Red River Line 56 Fed. R. 248 (1893), the court held
not liable the captain of a steamer who made a mooring negligently, in
consequence of which a freight hand was drowned, on the ground that the
defendant was acting as agent. The language, if not the decision, is un-
sound. So also: Henshaw vs. Noble, 7 Ohio St. 226 (1857), and Phinney
vs. Phinney, 17 How. Pr. 197 (1859).
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supplied by the common employer.8 And in Atkins vs. Field,'
where the defendant was held liable for faultily erecting a der-
rick, the court said, by way of dicta: "If the defendant * * *
had simply executed the will of a lawful superior as to details
of mode and materials, there might be said to be a mere non-
feasance on his part." That these decisions and statements are
wrong scarcely needs demonstration. The user of a negligently
dangerous instrument can not be excused because someone else
has supplied it; the economic compulsion to act according to
the will of the superior can scarcely be a defence. The law does
not distinguish the personality of agent as it does that of ex-
ecutor.
There is also a number of other cases in which the servant
was in fact affirmatively negligent towards the plaintiff and no
liability was enforced, on the ground that the servant was guilty
only of nonfeasance. In these cases, to be discussed presently,
the courts were however in accord with the language in De-
laney vs. Rochereau, that "no man* * * diminishes his obli-
gations to strangers by becoming an agent."
ONE MAY INCREASE HIS OBLIGATIONS TO STRANGFaS BY BECOMING
AN AGENT.
In considering whether an agent increases his obligations to
third persons by the assumption of his obligations as agent, it is
necessary to discuss very briefly elementary tort principles.
In every case of legal injury, there is predicated a direct
legal obligation from the defendant to the plaintiff and a breach
by the defendant. There must be an interest which the law
protects, an injury to that interest either by an affirmative act
Or a failure to act when there is an obligation to act, and a
reasonably close connection between the act or failure and the
final result. An injury to A's rights alone gives no cause of
action to B, though it may cause damnum to B. Promises to A,
9 N. 0. & T. P. Ry. vs. Robertson 25 Ky. L. R. 265, 74 S. W. R. 1061
(1903); Cinn., N. 0. & T. P. Ry. vs. McElroy, 146 Ky. 688, 142 S. W. R.
1009 (1912). The fact that the defendant could not correct the defect
(Mechem, Agency, 2nd. Ed. 61478) is immaterial as he was in control.
' 89 Me. 281, 36 At. R. 375 (1896).
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therefore, or obligations running to A cannot of themselves
confer rights upon B; and a failure to perform the promises or
obligations can not be the basis of an action by B. There must,.
im addition, be a breach of a direct obligation to him.
Since we are considering the obligations of an agent to the
principal only in order to determine the existence of an obliga-
tion to a third person, an agent may be considered, for our pur-
poses, as one under an obligation to another (his principal) to
perform or refrain from performing certain acts. So far as
the effect upon third persons is concerned, since the law does
not recognize the personality- of agent in actions against him,
it is immaterial whether or not the obligation to act or to refrain
from acting is created through the status of agency. A con.
tractual obligation between A and B would have-the same effect
in creating an obligation between A and C as an agency rela-
tionship between A and B. Furthermore, there may be situa-
tions where the breach of a non-censensual duty existing from
A to B may cause damnum to C and therefore fall within the
general scope of the discussion, for the purpose of anologies.
Our question may, then, be phrased thus: Under what cir-
cumstances does one (an agent), under a primary obligation to
another (his principal) to act or refrain from acting, owe,
because of this obligation, a further primary obligation to a
third person to act or refrain from acting, so that the latter, if
suffering damnum from the failure has a direct right against
the agent.
Control CGeates Obligation.
In considering this question, the most obvious case is that
where an agent is in control of tangible property and especially
where, owing to his failure to repair, the property becomes
dangerous to third persons. It is in this field that we find the
arguments centered around nonfeasance and misfeasance, a
needless and profitless discussion, as has been pointed out often.10
10Labatt Mfaster and Servant, Vol. 7, p. 7967. But see Mechem,
Agency, 2nd. Ed. §1466. Mr.-Mechem's discussion of the subject matter
covered by this article is very valuable and it is my misfortune that I did
not bee this edition of Mr. Mechem's work until after the completion of
this article.
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The whole basis of tort liability, so far as physical injuries are
concerned, at least, lies in control, or the .power to control.
Everyone has an obligation not to allow anything subject to his
control to injure another, either as a result of his conscious in-
tent to injure, or because of his negligence or, in special cases,
irrespective of fault. The distinction to be made is between
causing harm and failing to confer benefits, rather than between
misfeasance and nonfeasance. Wherever property subject to
one's control becomes dangerous to a third person ,there is an
obligation to act affirmatively. Thus, where a building becomes
unsafe to neighbors, from any cause whatever, there is an
obligation to remove the danger.1 And, in a number of juris-
dictions, a landowner is liable for damage caused by fires
started on his land, irrespective of the manner of origin, which
he "neglectfully '12 fails to put out. 8 So, through the medium
of estoppel, if A sees that B is selling A's land as that of B, to
C, A becomes liable, having the power to prevent that in which
he has control from injuring C.' 4 In placing responsibility upon
11 Hall vs. Gage, 172 S. W. R. 833 (Ark., 1914); Tucker vs. Ill. Cent.
By., 42 La. Ann. 114, 7 So. B. 124 (1890); Ainsworth vs. Lakin, 180 Mass.
397, 62 N. E. R. 746 (1902); Silverton vs. Marriott, 59 L. T. 61, 52 J. P.
677. See La. Civil Code, §2317.
The common law immunity of landowners from action where his prop-
erty in its natural condition caused damnum to a neighbor (Roberts vs.
Harrison, 101 Ga. 773, 28 S. E. R. 995, (1897), is but an example of the
limitation of the interests of one because of the seemingly greater necessi-
ties of another. The limit of the right of a legislature to compel a land-
owner to change the nature of his land, without compensation, under our
system of law, seems to be at the line drawn between injury and the con-
ferring benefits. See Tide Water Co. vs. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 518 (1866).
12 The word "neglectfully" is used here to mean negligently, as used
colloquially. Obviously, whether the defendant was negligent towards the
plaintiff depends upon the existence of a duty of care.
13 Clark vs. Kansas etc. Ry., 129 Red. R. 341 (1904); St. L. & S. Ry.
vs. Ford, 65 Ark. 96, 45 S. W. R. 55 (1898); Beckham vs. Ry., 127 Ga.
550, 56 S. E. R. 638 (1907) aemble; Excelsior P. M. Co. vs. Ry., 172 S. W.
B. 359 (Mo., 1914) semble; Baird vs. Chambers ,15 N. D. 618, 109 N. W. B.
61 (1906) aemble. Contra: Kenney vs. Hannibal etc. Ry., 70 Mo. 252
(1879).
1' Baillarge vs. Clark, 145 Cal. 589, 79 Pac. R. 268 (1904); Coram
vs. Palmer, 63 Fla. 116, 58 So. B. 721 (1912).
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one alleged to be the master of one doing a wrongful act, it is
the right to contrbl which is important. If it be urged that
there was an affirmative act in these cases, i. e., when control
was assumed, it may be answered that in the first two cases, there
has never been a suggestion that liability would be less if the
defendant were an infant who had inherited and knew nothing
of the property.
But further, we may find an obligation to act where the sole
danger lay in the person of the defendant. For instance, he has
a contagious disease and fails to warn those coming near him."5
He has not assumed any obligation here, yet, being in control
of his body, an instrumentality which has become dangerous to
others, he must act to prevent the injurious result. Or to take
another ease for which no decision directly analagouus can be
found. A is seized while asleep and placed in the middle of the
road. When he awakens he discovers that he is a menace to
travelers, but remains, though free to leave. A traveler riding
a bicycle runs upon him, non-negligently anJ is injured. Irre-
spective of any obligation to the state, our legal sense tells us
that A is liable to the traveler; the reason is that his body has
become a source of danger, and being in control, A must remove
it. These are, of course, exceptional cases, as normally control
must be assumed by a volition, and one is not legally in control
of all that over which he has physical power. Of course there
may be liability without immediate control.16 Wherever control
does exists, however, liability exists irrespective of the manner
of its acquisition.
In the agency cases, then, if we can find that the
agent was in control of the property which he knew or ought
to have known was dangerous to others, he becomes liable, not as
agent, of course, and irrespective of whether or not he is per-
forming his duties to his employer. '"Control ' is not an easy
word to define, nor do I think it necessary to attempt what I feel
I I Hendricks vs. Butcher, 144 Mo. App. 671, 129 S. W. R. 431 (1910) ;
and see: King vs. Vantandillo, 4 M. & S. 72 (1815); Smith vs. Baker, 20
Fed. 709 (1884); Christy vs. Butcher, 153 Mo. App. 397, 134 S. W. R.
1058 (1911).
16 Knoop vs. Alter, 47 La. Ann. 570, 17 So. R. 139 (1895).
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sure would be as profitless as most attempts at definition. It is
omething like "possession" as used in criminal law, though it
is obviously much broader. It has not been suggested that the
subtleties between custody and possession should be perpetu-
ated in torts. One to whom a dynamite bomb has been delivered
by his master is in control of it, though he may not be able to
steal it. And there may be effective control of situations, where,
from the nature of things, it is impossible to have possession,
which connotes physical and localized property.
An Agent in Control of Physical Prolierty whkch Injures
the Plaintiff.
To consider some of the cases which have arisen and be-ginning with the least difficult. It is clear that an engineer at
the throttle is in control-of a boiler, being placed there to exer-
cise superintendence over it; and it should not need demonstra-
tion that it is immaterial whether he ties down the safety valve
or fails to untie it, whether he "affirmatively" injures the boiler
or continues to use a defective one.17 It would be absurd to hold
that a servant placed at the open door of a tiger's cage with
instructions to close the door when there is any indication that
the tiger will escape and who goes to sleep, is not liable to a
member of the public injured through the escape of the tiger
because he was guilty only of "nonfeasance." Only in the
amount of alertness required does he differ from the agent given
exclusive management of real estate. The latter may allow the
property to become a menace to human life as truly as the
sleeping attendant. It is true that the question is entirely inde-
pendent of the question of agency. He would be equally liable
if, with a contract to repair, he were placed in control.1 s To
this extent and in this situation, the court in Delaney vs.
Rochereau was correct in saying that one does not increase his
7 Haynes' Adm'rs. vs. Ry., 145 Ky. 209, 140 S. W. it. 176 (1912)
Semble.
Is Conaolidated Ga Co. vs. Conior, 114 Md. 140, 78 At. i. 725 (1910).
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obligation to strangers by becoming an agent.1 9 The underlying
difficulty with the language of the court and with the reasoning
in other opinions which make the liability of the agent depend
upon the existence of something more than non-feasance in
similar cases, is that one in control is relieved from liability,
seemingly because he is an agent.2 0
Divided Control.
It is necessary, however, to consider the question of the
obligation to the principal for the purpose of determining the
existence of control; for generally control is taken over from
the principal or some former agent. In the case of a chattel
in the custody of an agent, or in the case of a moving force
managed by an agent, there is usually undivided control. But
where that control is separated, it may be difficult to decide
whether the agent has that control which will make him respon-
sible for failure to take means to prevent injuries.2 ' An engi-
1' See the following eases approving the language of Delaney vs.
Rochereau, but reaching opposite result: Stiewel vs. Borman, 63 Ark. 30,
37 S. W. R. 404 (2896); Baird vs. Shipman, 132 Ill. 16, 23 N. E. R. 384
(1890); .Cameron vs. Kenyon C. C. Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. B. 358
(1899).
20 The division of authority in the U. S. is fairly indicated by the
following eases: No liability: Williams vs. Dean, 134 Ia. 216, 111 N. W, R.
931 (1907) semble; Minnis vs. Younker Bros., 118 N. W. R. 532 (Ia., 1908);
Dean vs. Brock, 31 Ind. App. 507, 39 N. E. R. 829 (1894); F.eltus vs.
Swan, 62 Miss. 415 (2884), a "malicious" failure to act; Murray vs.
Usher, 117 N. Y. 542, 23 N. E. R. 564 (1889), 8emble; Van Antwerp vs.
Linton, 35 N. Y. S. 318, aff. 157 N. Y. 716 (1895); New York & W. P. T.
Co. vs. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298 (1860), sembie; Drake vs. Hagan, 108 Tenn.
265, 62 S. W. R. 470 (1902) semble. Contra: Mayer vs. Thompson Hutchin-
son Bldg. Co., 104 Ala. 611, 16 So. R. 620 (1894); Lough vs. Davis, 30
Wash. 204, 70 Pac. R. 491; 35 Wash. 449, 77 Pac. R. 732 (1902); Tippe-
canoe L. & T. Co. vs. Jester, 180 Ind. 357, 101 N. E. R. 915 (1913); Camp-
bell vs. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552 (1875); Bannigan vs, Woodbury,
158 Mich. 206, 122 N. W. R. 531 (1909), administrator; Carter vs. At.
Coast Line Ry., 84 S. C. 546, 66 S. E. R. 997 (1908). See also Cline vs.
Crescent By., 41 La. Ann. 1031, 6 So. B. 851 (1889), in which the Louisiana
court seemed inclined to limit the effect of Delaney vs. Rochereau.
21 Where a number are in control of a dangerous instrument, it must
be shown that the defendant's control is effective: Burch vs. Caden Stone
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neer at the throttle is normally in control of the engine. That
he was directed by his employer to allow the safety valve to
remain tied down would be no defence. Operating a force dan-
gerous to others, he is liable whether or not he breaks an agree-
ment with his master and whether or not he increases the danger
or merely fails to decrease it. 2
On the other hand where there is not this direct manual
custody, it is often necessary to consider the authority of the
agent to determine whether or not effective control has been
taken. A real estate agent, for instance, who is permitted by the
owner to make only a certain class of repairs has not control over
the premises.25 If he is to make all needed repairs and manages
the property he is in control. This distinction explains cases
like Hill vs. Caverly.2 4  In this case the defendant, as servant,
shut the gates of a dam, acting within the rights possessed by his
employer. He failed to open the gates later at a time when
keeping them closed was dangerous to the plaintiff, who was
injured by the breaking of the dam. But, if the court was cor-
rect in its interpretation of the facts, the defendant was not
Co., 93 Fed. R. 181 (1899). The liability of a superior servant for acts
performed by those under him depends upon whether he effectively directed
the wrongful acts to be done: Hewett vs. Swift, 3 Allen 420 (1862); Nun-
nelly vs. Southern Iron Co., 94 Tenn. 397, 29 S. W. R. 361 (1895). But see:
Orcutt vs. Century Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 424, 99 S. W. R. 1062 (1906). He
is not liable for the acts of servants acting under his directions on the
ground of responeat superior: Stone vs. Cartwright, 6 T. R. 411 (1795);
Frorer vs. Baker, 137 Ill. App. 588 (1907); Ellis vs. Southern By., 72 S. C.
465, 52 S. E. R. 228 (1905); Weis vs. Skinner, 178 S. W .R. 34 (Tex.,
1915) ; Brown vs. Lent, 20 Vt. 529 (1848). Nor can the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, applicable against a railroad, be used against the engineer
of the derailed train: Bryce vs. Southern Ry., 125 Fed. B. 958 (1903).
2 2An exception seems to exist as to the continuance of a nuisance
existing at the time of taking control: Penruddock's Case, 5 Rep. 1OOb
(1598). In case of a dam, one taking control is liable to a lower owner
whose land is wrongly flooded, only after notice to remove, unless, after tak-
ing control, he increases the height or changes the form: Noyes vs. Still-
man, 24 Conn. 15 (1855); Pillsbury vs. Moore, 44 Me. 154 (1857); Carle-
ton vs. Bedington, 1 Foster (N. H.) 291 (1850). An agent in control
would not be liable therefore, until after notice.
23 Lough vs. Davis & Co., 35 Wash. 449, 77 Pac. R. 732 (1902).
14 7 N. H. 215 (1834).
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given full control; his instructions were to open only at the
command of the company and at the time of the accident he had
no more authority to open them than any stranger. He had
assumed control and then surrendered it. He was like a chauf-
feur who starts the engine of a car and then surrenders the
wheel to his employer. The fact that he remains in the machine
and has it in his physical power to apply the brake does not
make him liable to a third person injured by the careless driving
of his employer, unless it can be said to be a common enterprise:
Control at a Time Prior to the Injury.
One servant may start a force and then rightfully turn con-
trol over to another without being subjected to liability for the
latter's failure or without creating any obligation to take subse-
quent positive action.25 On the other hand if, in Hill vs. Cav-.
erly, the defendant had known, or perhaps, should have known,
that his principal did not intend to open the gates of the dam,
he would be liable, not because he was in control at the time, but
because he had set a force in motion under circumstances which
indicated that it would injure third persons. Continuing the
chauffeur example, one may have a right to start a machine on
the land of his employer, but if his orders were to start the
machine and he knew that no provision would be made for
stopping it, he would be liable if it escaped into the street and
injured a pedestrian. In this case there exists a necessity for
positive action because the first act was wrongful; in the other
case it is the control at the time which makes the affirmative
action necessary. As stated before, the duties of the agent should
be considered only for the purpose of determining the existence
of control; when that is found, it is immaterial whether or not
the agent commits a breach of his agreement with his employer.
25 So one may dig a ditch in a place in which it would be dangerous
to others, if he has reason to believe that his employer will protect the
public against injury, by warning: Jessup vs. Sloneker, 142 Pa. 527; 21
At. R. 988 (1891). So an agent, seizing cattle under his principal's right,
is not liable where his principal subsequently takes control over them and
wrongly keeps them: Kimborough vs. Boswell, 119 Ga. 201, 45 S. E. R.
977 (1903).
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There are other cases where there is no actual control at
the time of the injury and in which the use of nonfeasance and
misfeasance seems to create difficulty. For instance, a mechanic
fails properly to inspect a part of the machine and there is a
subsequent injury to a third person. Or there is a duty of in-
spection which is not performed and the defective part, which
would have been repaired if there had been a proper inspection
and report upon it injures someone. In these cases, there was
partial control at one time and, in theory, they are like, in a
number of aspects, the case of the manufacturer or bridge
builder who makes a defective product which later causes in-
jury to a third person. There is the same primary obligation to
the purchaser or principal in both cases and the same sort of
injury to the one injured. In the "manufacturer cases," the
grounds of convenience upon which recovery is denied, save in
cases of the most glaring type, are well known. While, in some
of these cases, the point is made that there was no control at the
time of the accident 2 (which only emphasizes the necessity of
control at some period in the transaction), the real difficulty is
that of remoteness.2 1 Considering the seriousness of the prob-
able injury, the defendant's obligation of care is not extended
so as to include the person injured.
The courts which reach this result of non-liability in the
agency cases are wrong in at least two aspects. First, when a
servant fails to inspect a boiler or railway car, he is dealing
with something intrinsically dangerous and, under the gener-
ally accepted exception built up from Thomas vs. Winchester,2
he should be liable. And, secondly, when the defendant is em-
ployed to provide against the very contingency which occurs, it
can not be said that the consequence is too remote.29
26 As in Albany vs. Cunliff, 2 N. Y. 165 (1859).
27 See Daugherty vs. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255, 44 N. E. R. 457 (1896);
Curtin vs. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 At. R. 244 (1891); First Presbyterian
Congregation vs. Smith, 163 Pa. 561, 30 At. R. 279 (1894).
2a 6 N. Y. 397 (1852).
20 Murray vs. Cowhead, 148 Ky. 591, 147 S. W. R. 6 (1912), servant
had duty of inspecting telephone poles, one of which fell on plaintiff; Van
Winkle vs. Am. Steam Boiler Co., 52 N. J. L. 240, 19 At. R. 472 (1890),
where agent failing to inspect boiler was held liable to third person injured
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But it is said, in some cases, that the situation is not the same
as that of the manufacturer ,who actively places a dangerous
machine on the market; the agent who is guilty only of non-
feasance has created no active force; he is not a cause and he
has simply failed to prevent an injury. He is not a legal cause
since he neither adds to the original force nor gives it new
direction. 0  But this proves too much. The same is true of
many who control property. One taking possession of dyna-
mite, which he allows to remain in a dangerous position, causes
the injury to one injured by an explosion, only to the same
extent. If affirmative action is required, it takes place when
he assumes control and thereby prevents others from eliminat-
ing the danger. In the same way, the agent who neglectfully
fails to inspect, produces the injury, as his assumption of con-
trol, with his failure to properly exercise it, allows an instru-
mentality, which we may assume as a fact, generally, would
have been made innocuous, to remain dangerous.
The case is not essentially different from that where a watch-
man is stationed to give warning of a blast about to be fired or
a package to be dropped from a window upon the sidewalk. One
so stationed scarcely could resist liability on the ground that
there was a mere failure of duty as servant.
3
' Neither could one
who was to place a red lantern upon an obstruction in the street.
by explosion; Durkin vs. Kingston Coal Co., 171 Pa. 193, 33 At. R. 237
(1895), foreman liable where he had negligently failed to discover a defect
by which workman was injured. Contra: Kelley vs. Chicago & A. R. Ry.,
122 Fed. R. 286 (1903), the court relying upon Story, Agency, 9th Ed.
§308; Floyt vs. Shenango Furnace Co., 186 Fed. R. 539 (1911), manager
not liable for failing to discover defects in premises.
3 It is generally true, as stated in Wiley vs. West Jersey Ry. Co.,
44 N. J. L. 247 (1882), that failure to act does not "break causal connec-
tion" between the act of a wrongdoer and the final result. This cannot
mean, however, that failure to act is not a cause, nor that it may not be a
legal cause. For instance, A throws B into shallow water face down, and
B, thinking it a convenient time to die, resolves to remain there and drown
and does so. Did A (alone) kill B, or is it not true that B's volition to
remain there is at least a legal cause of his death. Cf. Hendrickson vs.
Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 281, 3 S. W. R. 166 (1887).
*1 Boyd vs. Ins. Patrol, 113 Pa. 269, 6 At. R. 536 (1886) semblde.
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The one who employed him, by that fact ,showed that he was
prepared to keep it from being dangerous. The danger is
created by the defendant's assumption of control, i. e., his repre-
sentation that he would place the lantern upon it, added to his
subsequent failure. He has intermeddled to the injury of the
one injured.
It is true that the obligation to his employer may not be the
measure of his duty to the third persons. He may have guar-
anteed that the lantern would be in place, while he would be
liable to third persons only if he failed to use due care or was
at fault.3 2  Or he may have been an infant whose contract was
not binding. But this only serves to show again that the re-
covery by the injured party is not dependent upon any contract
existing beween master and servant, but upon the assumption
of control, for the particular purpose, over the instrumentality.
Some of the cohrts, retaining the distinction between non-
feasance and misfeasance, but defining misfeasance very broadly
in order to achieve substantial justice, say that a servant is
liable who enters upon the undertaking, but that he does this
only when he takes physical steps towards performance.3 3 But
in fact when does he enter upon the undertaking? When he
starts with the lantern, or when he accepts the duty of placing
it upon the obstruction? Is it material whether an inspector of
boilers actually begins the inspection or remains away. The
effect is the same in either case; the quality of the defendant's
act is the same. In both cases he has control over the situation.
A priori, it would seem that one who consciously refrains from
acting, after an assurance that he would act, would be in. a
worse position than one who negligently fails in the work. It
would seem, therefore, that unless misfeasance can be inter-
preted as being the assumption of an obligation to the employer
and a neglectful or wilful failure to enter upon the duties,
under such circumstances that the employee ought to expect
31 See Galbraith vs. Ill. Steel Co., 133 Fed. R. 485 (1904). In ease
of one building for another, the obligations of the first to the public are
not measured by the terms of the contract, but by the probability of danger
to the public in the erection of the building.
"3 See Southern Ry. vs. Rowe, 2 Ga. App. 557, 59 S. E. R. 462 (1907).
Cf. Note 35 infra.
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that physical injury to third persons would result from such
failure, to hold that there can be liability only for misfeasance
is to disregard the plainest tort principles. The agent does
increase his obligations to third persons by becoming an agent,
where that agency places him in control of property which may
injure others.
Looking at the matter from another angle, a failure to hold
the servant to accountability to the third person is illogical. A
master is in many cases held liable for the non-action of a
servant where the master has no affirmative duties of protection,
but is subject to a duty only to keep his property from injur-
ing them after he knows or should know it is dangerous. For
instance, Smith owns a warehouse which catches fire during
the night. We will assume, as is generally a fact, there is no
obligation upon him to watch it to see that it does not take fire.
If, then, he places no watchman there, he is not liable if fire
does catch and a neighbor's house is burned. If however, a
watchman were present and he failed to give- the alarm or do
what he could to extinguish the blaze or keep it from going to
the neighbor's house the master is liable. And he is liable to
the third person because he, through his extended personality,
the servant, was negligent in the control of the property. He
is liable obviously not because the servant has been guilty of a
fault against him, for A cannot complain of an act wrong only
;is to B, but because the servant failure to act was wrongful as
against the third person. 4 To hold the employer of the servant,
who was only vicariously in control, and not to make the one
whose fault was the cause and who was in actual control liable
directly to the third person, is anomalous.
Control of a Situation; the Agent Interferes with the Plaintifl's
Relations with Others.
In all of the cases thus far dealt with, the plaintiff has been
injured by something in the control of the defendant and owned
by the principal. The principal, as well as the agent is liable
in an action of tort, because the plaintiff's right to security,
.' Cf. Aldrich vs. Boston & Worcester Ry. Co., 100 Mass. 31 (1868).
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existing against everyone, has been interfered with. Cases may
be suggested, however, in which the plaintiff has been injured
by the defendant (agent), either as to his person, physical prop-
erty, or pecuniary interests, only in the sense that through the
action of the defendant, he has failed to receive something from
a third person which he would have received otherwise.
3 5 For
instance, a company contracts to guard A, or a fire extinguisher
company contracts to install an efficient system of fire protection
for A, or a physician is about to send medicines to A, or a
broker has agreed to sell shares to A. In all of these cases as-
sume that the agent, to whom the affair was entrusted, fails to
guard, or to put in the extinguishers or to deliver the medidine
or to sell the shares, and that A is beaten or continues sick, or
suffers loss of goods by fire or is unable to get the title to the
shares. Can the assumption of the obligation to the principal
be the basis of liability to A, or do we have here the case of a
duty to one which can not create an obligation to another?
Where the Agent Intends the Result When Assuming the
Obligation.
Where the defendant intends the result, there is little diffi-
culty in finding a breach of a legal duty. Suppose, for instance,
the agent knew that A was in danger and entered the employ
of the company having the contract to guard him in order that
A might be deprived of this protection. The assumption of the
duty was simply a means of depriving A of something to which
he had a right.38 For this reason, the same result is reached if
1- Failure to act in these cases was said by the court in Consolidated
Gas Co. vs. O'Connor, 114 Aid. 140, 78 At. R. 725 (1910), to be nonfeasance
for which one would not be liable to third persons, while failure to take
even the first step towards acting in the situations previously discussed is
malfeasance. So also (sernble) in Tippecanae L. & T. Co. vs. Jester, 180
Ind. 357, 101 N. E. R. 915 (1913). And see Orcutt vs. Century Bldg. Co.,
201 Mlo. 424, 29 S. W. R. 1062 (1907). Cf. Mechen, Agency, 2nd Ed.,
§1471.
36 A's action being entirely distinct from the right of action on the
contract is not affected by the common-law rule that "malice" does not
increase the amount of recoverable damages in case of breach of contract.
Baumgarten vs. Alliance Assurance Co., 159 Fed. R. 275 (1908). In civil
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the "guarding company" was under no legal obligation to
guard A. It is sufficient if the company would have protected
A but for the defendant's assumption of the duty, as A had the
legal right to receive help from others. So in the "medicine
case." It is the same as if A, drowning near shore, is about to
be rescued by B, when the defendant forcibly prevents the
rescue or gives him false information which causes B to leave.
Recovery can be had here as in the case of interference with
contractual or other voluntary relationships. The accepting of
the duty with knowledge that it will not be performed and the
intention to keep aid from the other is the gist of the wrong.
It would seem, further, that it is not necessary to have
specific "malice," but merely an intent not to perform. In
deceit it is not necessary to have a specific desire to injure; nor
is it in the case of interference with business relationships. 37
It is enough that there is knowledge that the effect of the trans-
action will be to deprive the plaintiff of something to which he
has a legal right. Of course in the first and .second cases sug-
gested above, there may not be certain knowledge that the assist-
ance will be needed. On the other hand, the plaintiff is deprived
of the protection he needed and the defendant acted or failed to
act with full consciousness of the possibility of the result. Re-
covery is not sought upon the contract with the employer; it is
based upon wrongful interference, or the wrongful taking of
control.
If this is correct, the acceptance of a contractual obligation
in favor of one may create a non-contractual duty to act affirma-
tively as regards another. For although the gist of the wrong
in the above cases may be the deceitful acceptance, the legal
injury does not take place until the failure to act affirmatively,
for only then would there be the damnum necessary for an
law jurisdictions, even the contracting parties could recover more in case of
a "malicious" breach of contract. See Civil Code of La., §1934; Civil Code
of Lower Canada, §1054.
37 So also where there is a misrepresentation as to title, which forms
the basis of estoppel: Horn vs. Cole, 51 N. H. 287 (1868). And see Con-
way Nat. Bk. vs. Pease, 76 N. H. 319, 82 At. R. 1068 (3912). Refusing
to allow one to recover or claim property because of an estoppel in pas is,
of course, making him responsible for his misrepresentation.
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action on the case. It is true that the totality of the defendant's
act may be said to be more than non-feasance, since his accept-
ance was used only as a tool to cause injury to the plaintiff.
But as I understand the cases -dsing the term nonfeasance, and
the language of the court in Delaney vs. Rochereau, failure to
act after the acceptance is considered nonfeasance, and there
is no-more than this in the supposed cases.
Assumption of Obligation In Good Faith With Subsequent
Neglect. Physical Injuries.
Assuming there is no original "deceit" or wrongful act, can
this mere "nonfeasance" be a breach of duty to the third
party? Did the assumption of the duty create an obligation to
act affirmatively in respect to the third person? Assume that
the "agent to guard" negligently oversleeps, or the "agent to
deliver the medicine'! failed to call for it, or the agent to install
extinguishers omitted to do so, intentionally or neglectfully. The
actual damnum is clear; the plaintiff has suffered loss which
he would not have suffered but for the defendant's interference
in the transaction, since it may reasonably be assumed as a fact
that A would have received the thing contracted for through
some other niore reliable agent. (If the facts do not develop this
last point, of course, there will not be a case for the plaintiff under
this view.) The plaintiff's interest is one. which the law pro-
tects, for if "malice" is injected his right of action is clear.
There is physical damage to the person or tangible property, so
that it is not a part of the plaintiff's ease, as it seems to be
where there is only injury to pecuniary interests, that the de.
fendant intended the result. The sole question would seem to
be one of causation; whether or not there is sufficiently close
connection between the defendant's action and the final result
to create in favor of the third person, a duty not to intentional-
ly or neglectfully fail to perform the obligation he has assumed
to the principal.
Analogies: "Manufacturer" Cases.
Before considering the matter further on principle, we may
consider certain situations where the defendant, in committing
a breach of an obligation to one, causes damage to another. The
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first of these exists where a manufacturer sells a machine in
fact dangerous and which in fact injures the ultimate purchaser.
In these cases the courts have sometimes felt that to allow re-
covery would be to interfere with the'contractual relations
between buyer and seller-that there is no pivity. 8 This view,
of course, ignores the fact that the gist of the injury is causing
a thing; in fact dangerous, to injure the plaintiff through the
medium of an innocent instrumentality, the buyer. The manu-
facturer should be liable where without warning he gives some-
thing to another which he knows or ought to know is dangerous
and probably will cause damage to the class of persons of whom
the plaintiff is one. " The strongest ground for the support of
the cases is that of remoteness, i. e., that the defendant's act is
not #ufflciently close to the final result. This ground, as pre-
viously pointed out; cannot be urged in the agency cases, for
the agent's duties are such as to preclude the possibility that he
does not have the result in mind.
"Water Company" Cases.
The cases where a water company fails to supply water for
fire purposes and the plaintiff's house is thereby burned, are
more nearly in point. The language in most of these cases seems
to be against the principle now contended for. In many of the
cases, however, the action was brought upon the contract with
the municipality and the plaintiff failed to show that he was a
party to it.40 In others, the plaintiff went no further than to
show that the contract with the city was not performed by the
defendant. 1 In some, it is assumed that to impose liability at
3 See Hasbrook vs. Armour & Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. R. 157
(1909).
30 See Krahn vs. T. L. Owens Co., 125 Minn. 33, 145 N. W. R. 626
(1914). There is, in any case of neglectful conduct, no duty as to all the
world. The duty is only to that class which the defendant might reason-
ably expect would be injured by his conduct. See Garland vs. B. *& M. Ry.,
76 N. H. 556, 86 At. R. 141 (1913).
' As in Allen & Currey Mfg. Co. vs. Shreveport Waterworks Co., 113
La. 1091, 37 So. B. 980 (1905).
- As in German Alliance Co. vs. Home Water Co., 226 U. S. 220
(1912).
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all would make the water company an insurer in case of failure
to keep up the pressure contracted for.4 2  But this last suppo-
sition is an argument against an imaginary evil. For, to create
tort liability, there must be conduct, which, in view of the obli-
gation undertaken and the probability of the damage, would be
considered negligence. In addition the plaintiff would have to
prove causal connection between the defendant's failure and
the loss.4 8 With these elements present there is no good ground
for refusing recovery.
"Fire Department" Cases.
It is difficult to differentiate the above cases from those
where there is a wrongful interference with a hose or a fire
company about to save the plaintiff's property, in which cases
the courts are almost unanimous in allowing recovery." In
Metallic Compression Casting Co. vs. Fitchburg Railroad, 5 the
court makes the distinction of remoteness-that the advantage
to the plaintiff in these cases is not prospective (as in the water-
works cases) but immediate.'8 But in Chicago M. & St. P. Ry.
42 Hone vs. Presque Isle Water Co., 104 Me. 217, 71 At. R. 769 (1908).
43See Woodbury vs. Waterworks Co., 57 Fla. 243, 49 So. R. 556
.(1909).
"4American Sheet etc. Co. vs. Pittsburg Ry., 143 Fed. R. 789 (1906),
Little Rock Traction Co. vs. McCaskill, 75 Ark. 133, 86 S. W. R. 997 (1905);
Houren vs. Ry., 236 Ill. 620, 86 N. E. R. 611 (1908); Kiernan vs. Metro-
politan Const. Co., 170 Mass. 378, 49 N. E. R. 648 (1898); Clark vs. Grand
Trunk Ry., 149 Mich. 400, 112 N. W. R. 1121 (1907), semble; Erickson
vs. G. N. By., 117 Minn. 348, 135 N. W. R. 1129 (1912); Hurley vs. Mo.
K. & T. Ry., 170 Mo. App. 235, 156 S. W. R. 57 (1913); Phoenix Ins. Co.
vs. N. Y. Central Ry., 106 N. Y. Supp. 696 (1907); Walker vs. Mo. Pao.
Ry., 149 Pac. 677 (Kan., 1915) semble. Contra: Bosch vs. Burlington & M.
Ry., 44 Ia. 402 (1876).
4"109 Mass. 277 (1872).
4"See also opinion in German Alliance Co. vs. -Rome Water Co., in
174 Fed. R. 764 (1909), where the court, admitting the possibility of re-
covery on principle, denies it in the case, as the imminence of the danger
was not great. In these cases the courts seem to overlook the fact -that,
while damage to any particular individual plaintiff cannot be foreseen,
damage to one of the class is an almost certain result of the company's
failure to supply water.
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vs. Housen,4' the wrongful conduct was in negligently blocking
the road before the beginning of the fire, so that the firemen,
upon being called were obliged to wait and the plaintiff's build-
ing was more severely damaged than it would have been without
the blockade. In White vs. Colorado Ry. Co.,'4 the wrongful
conduct was in blocking the way to the plaintiff's goods so that
when a fire began they could not be rescued. It may be said,
however, that the person to be injured is more clearly marked
cut than in the waterworks cases and this distinction, slight
though-it is, seems to make an important difference in the manu-
facturer cases.
In all of the cases used as analogies, save where the court
has felt itself bound by a previously announced rule,4 9 the effort
has been to discover whether the plaintiff might have been ex-
pected reasonably to foresee an injurious result of the same
general sort as that which occurred and whether his conduct was
an efficient cause of the final result. In all of them, where the
court has ruled against recovery, it has invaded, rightfully
enough perhaps in most cases, the function of the jury in making
it a matter of law that the plaintiff could not reasonably have
expected such result or that the act was not an effective cause.
We must not be deceived into thinking, however, that what the
courts have treated as law is not a matter of fact; the courts
have simply made convenient classifications. The decisions
should not be authprities against recovery in cases in a distinct
class.
And in the agency cases the plaintiff should succeed. Leav-
ing aside any questions of what would c6nstitute justification,
when the agent knowingly fails to perform, he is consciously
subjecting a known person to known danger. He is like a manu-
facturer who knowingly sends out a defective machine in which
47 139 Ill. App. 116, aff. 236 flL 620, 86 N. E. R. 611 (1908).
4s Fed. Cas. 17, 543 (1879).
4 As in "Ellis vs. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 65 So. R. 805 (Ala.,
1914). The Alabama court is consistent in refusing recovery where one
interferes with a fire company on its way to a fire, by a passive blockade:
Louisville & N. Ry. vs. Scruggs, 161 Ala. 97, 49 So. R. 399 (1909).
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ca~e it is conceded that liability exists. 0 Where the agent acts
'neglectfully, he should be liable, not only because he must have
had in mind the possibility of damage, but also because he
knows the individual upon whom the injury will fall, something
the decisions, rightfully or wrongly, make important in the
analogous cases.51 He who keeps another from giving assistance
is, for this purpose, as much a cause of the result, i. e., the
assault or the burning, as the active agent. In fact the case is a
complement to that where one is made liable to A for injuries
received by A in attempting to rescue B from a position of
danger in which the defendant had negligently placed B. In
this latter case, as in the agency cases, the theory of recovery
is that the defendant's breach of duty, i A., wrongful conduct,
to B, is wrongful as to A because the defendant should have
anticipated that it would cause physical damage to A's person or
property.2
Some of the difficulties suggested to allowing the third person
to recover from the agent have been mentioned previously. The
principal and agent will not be free in their contractual rela-
tions, it is said. But the plaintiff can not recover unless the
agent fails to fulfil the terms of his understanding, with the
principal, whatever it was, unless there was affirmative action.
Nor will the agent be an insurer; he is liable only for fault.
But it is said that the pla'ntiff will in fact be recovering upon a
contractual or at least a consensual agreement between the agent
and principal. This is not true. The plaintiff is not suing as
a beneficiary on the contract, but because his legally protected
interests have been interfered with. He is not claiming that the
defendant should have conferred a benefit upon him, which is
the distinguishing mark of a contract. His complaint is that
the defendant has put him in a worse position than that hQ
would have occupied without the defendant's interference,
which, -when legally protected interests are involved and there
is no affirmative defence, constitutes a tort. Another objection
60 Kuelling vs. Lean Mfg. Co., 183 N. Y. 78, 75 N. E. R. 1098 (1905).
52 Levy vs. Langridge, 4 M. & W. 337 (1838).
52 Perpich vs. Leetonia Mining Co., 118 Minn. 508, 137 N. W. R. 12
(1912).
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raised is that the agent and principal may settle all affairs
between them and still leave the agent liable to a third person.
But there is no more reason why this settlement should effect
the rights of the third person, who has suffered an independent
injury, than should a settlement with the savages in Tarleton vs.
M cGauley' s have been a defence to the plaintiff's action. The
question of due care may be a troublesome one, but that is in-
herent in the subject. It is the care which an "undertaker"
should use. There has been no great. difficulty in defining the
care which should be used by a surgeon in the pay of a city
treating a charity patient, a situation, by the way, in which it
has not been suggested that the surgeon would not be liable
where he has failed to give the proper medicine, as well as
where he has given the wrong kind.5 '
This last case suggests another fundamental reason for hold-
ing the agent to accountability. He is in control of the situation.
An illustrative case suggests the soundness of this method of
approach. Suppose A, who wishes to descend into a deep pit,
does so upon B's gratuitous promise, given in good faith, to
stand by and pull him out. B subsequently goes to sleep and
A dies of exposure. There is here no contractual obligation, nor
is there any deceit; yet B's liability could scarcely be ques-
tioned. It does not help us to say that a gratuitous agent is
liable for negligently failing to act after the assumption of the
agency," unless we give the underlying reason for liability. We
may fairly use the analogy of the gratuitous bailee, or even
the bailee for hire, who is sued for injury to the goods, not in
contract but in tort. The real reason for liability seems to be
that there is possession or control, subject to the general obliga-
tion to be efficient in that control."8
5Peake, 205 (1804).
s' Edwards vs. Lamb, 59 N. H. 599, 45 At. R. 480 (1899); Nelson vs.
Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N. W. R. 228 (1888). And see cases cited
14 L. R. A. 429.
,' Attleboro Mfg. Co. vs. Frankfort M. A. Ins.. Co., 171 Fed. R 495
(1909).
56 Thus one promising to take charge of (assume control of) one hav-
ing a contagious disease is liable to a third person catching disease through
neglectful control of defendant: Missouri, K. & T. Ry. vs. Waod, 95 TeM.
273, 66 S. W. R. 449, aff. 68 S. W. R. 802 (1902).
THE LIABILITY OF AN AGENT IN TORT
Taking a step further, suppose B, getting tired of remaining,
but still feeling his obligation to A, gets C to promise that he
will draw B to the surface and, upon receiving C's promise, B
goes away. C then goes to sleep, and A, perforce, remains in
the pit. Will the legal result be different than before, because
the defendant's promise was made, not to A, but to the. inter-
mediary.Y7 The effect is the same in both cases and so is the
quality of the neglectful act. The liability is the same as that
where one takes control of a child or other helpless person and
fails to feed it or preserve it from harm." The hunger felt by
the child follows as a result of the control assumed by the de-
fendant and wrongly exercised. The assumption of control
creates the same sort of relationship for the purposes of torts as
that created by a contract between the parties. It would follow
then that when an agent consents to act for the principal in
regard to another person, there is a special relationship created
between the agent and that other person, which creates a duty
on the agent, within the limits of his assumption, to perform his
duties in such a manner that physical harm shall not come to
the person or property of the other.5 9
Injury to Pecuniary Interests.
Where there has been no physical injury and the sole damage
is to the plaintiff's pecuniary interests, there is little in the
cases in support of liability, where there is no fraud at the
57 Where one supplies appliances for use of another, there is a duty
to use care to supply sufficient ones, irrespective of any contractual obliga-
tion: Gregor vs. Cody, 82 Me. 331, 19 At. R. 108 (1889); Hall vs. Bates,
216 Mass. 140, 103 N. E. R. 285 (1913). The basis of the action is not
the promise to furnish, for which no action would lie save in contract, if
one existed (Dice's Admr's. vs. Zweigart's Adm'r., 161 Ky. 646, 171 S. W.
R. 195 (1914); Dustin vs. Curtis, 74 N. H. 266, 61 At. R. 220 (1907),)
but the reliance upon the performance of the act undertaken.
5"Regina vs. Instan, 17 Cox. Cr. Cas. 602 (1893.). And see People
vs. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N. W. R. 1128 (1907); Dyche. vs. Ry.
Co., 79 Miss. 361, 30 So. R. 711 (1901).
go In Owens vs. Nichols, 139 Ga. 475, 77 S. E. R. 635 (1913), an
agent of a firm under contract to keep the plaintiff's property in repair
was held liable to plaintiff for injuries to the property due to neglectful
failure to repair.
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beginning of the undertaking. Dealing with analogous cases
first, the courts have refused recovery where a defendant com-
mitted a tort against A the effect of which was to injure B.
Thus there was no recovery where the defendant beat an actor,
who was thereby prevented from fulfilling an engagement with
the plaintiff ;6O where the defendant enticed the plaintiff's hus-
band to commit adultery ;61 or where the defendant injured the
plaintiff's husband ;62 or where the defendant killed one insured
by the plaintiff's company;03 or injured an employee of the
plaintiff whom the latter was obliged to compensate under the
employer's liability act ;04 or caused wrongfully a ship to leave
the plaintiff's wharf so that the latter was deprived of his wharf-
age dues;65 or where the defendant negligently broke an electric
wire in the street causing the plaintiff, who used electric power,
to stop business.6"
In these cases the plaintiff in breaking an obligation to one
caused damnum to-the plaintiff's pecuniary interests. So far as
the plaintiff (third person) is concerned, it is immaterial whether
the defendant's wrongful act was a tort or a breach of contract
against the one whose relations with the plaintiff have been in-
terfered with which make them analagous, roughly, to the
agency cases. But in many of them there were special reasons
why recovery should not be had. Thus in some of them the
wife's historical disability to sue for injuries to her through her
:0 Taylor vs, Neri, 1 Esp. 386.
1 Nieberg vs. Cohen, 92 At. R. 214 (Vt., 1914).
*' Feneff vs. N. Y. etc. Ry., 203 Mass. 279, 89 N. E. R. 436 (1909).
"Ins. Co. vs. Brame, 95 U. S. 754 (1871); Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co.
vs. By., 25 Conn. 265 (1856); Rockingham etc. Ins. Co. vs. Bosher, 39 Me.
253 (1856).
64 Interstate TeL & Tel. Co. vs. Pub. Ser. El. Co., 86 N. J. L. 26, 90
At. R. 1062 (1914).
& Gregory vs. Brooks, 37 Conn. 365 (1870).
6 Byrd vs. English, 117 Ga. 191, 43 S. R. R. 419 (1903). For other
cases of the same general sort, see: Central Ga. P. Co. vs. Stubbs, 141 Ga.
172, 80 S. E. R. 636 (1913) ; Anthony vs. Slade, 11 Mete. 290 (1846); Perry
vs. Hayes, 213 Mass. 296, 102 N. E. R. 318 (1913); Cue vs. Breeland, 78
Miss. 864, 29 So. B. 850 (1901); Brink vs. Wabash Ry. Co., 160 Mo. 87,
68 S. W. B. 1058 (1901); Deaderick vs. Bank, 100 Tenn. 458, 45 S. W. R.
786 (1898).
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husband; in the insurance cases the defendant was subject to
an entire liability to the one injured and there had been no
interference with contractual or business relationships. But the
main ground for decision in all of them was remoteness-that
the defendant could not have foreseen reasonably the result of
his act, and in general the duty of care towards people or people
of a class is dependent upon foreseeability. The courts were
wrong in many of the cases on the facts and the attitude of the
courts, especially in Byrd vs. English, was much like that in
Ryan vs. New York Central Ry.,"7 a case now pretty Well dis-
credited even in its own jurisdiction. But accepting their
reasoning as sound it will not apply to the agency cases, where,
since the agent knew the nature of the injury to be suffered and
the one to be injured, it can not be said that the result is too
remote.
Whatever measure of comfort may be derived from these
cases is taken away, however by the agency cases themselves.
It has been held, or implied sub silento that there is no legal
wrong to the third person where the agent failed in his duty to
his principal in turning over property to the third person;O8
or in presenting the plaintiff's draft for payment;09 or in de-
livering shares of stock to the plaintiff;7o or in paying the
plaintiff;71 or in transmitting instructions for the plaintiff.7 2
So also where a number of employees concertedly stopped work,
with the incidental effect of damaging the plaintiff. 73  In most
of these cases, it is true, the pleading or evidence showed only
that the agent failed to act and not that it was wrongful
as between principal and agent. But the attitude of the courts
seems unmistakably clear and in accord with the language of the
court in the sole case which seems to be a square decision against
67 35 N. Y. 210 (1866).
68 Bradford vs. Eastburn, 2 Wash. C. C. 219, Fed. Cas. 1767 (1808).
89 Montgomery County Bk. vs. Albany City Bk., 7 N. Y. 459 (1852).
70 Denny vs. Manhattan Co., 2 Denjo, 115, 5 Denio 639 (1846).
71 Poydras vs. Delamere, 13 La. 98 (1839); Stephens vs. Bacon, 7
N. J. L. 1 (1822); Colvin vs. Holbrook, 2 N. Y. 126 (1848).
72 Reid vs. Humber, 49 Ga. 207 (1873).
73 Blackstock vs. N. Y. & N. E. By., 20 N. Y. 48 (1859).
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liability, Denny vs. Manhattan Co." Here the declaration al-
leged that the defendant fraudulently had failed to transfer
stock which the plaintiff was entitled to receive from the de-
fendant's employer and which it was the defendant's duty as
agent to transfer to the plaintiff. "Defendants were not the
agents of the plaintiff and owed them no duty. For a neglect
to discharge their agency, they were answerable to their princi-
pal, and to no one else."
The language in none of these cases is very convincing and
should not be an obstacle to a court which is willing to do more
than repeat the formula that for failure to act an agent is liable
only to his principal. The Denny case, at least, is wrong on
the grounds of Lumley vs. Gye.75 The agent had it in his con-
trol to perform the contract for his principal, and, knowing that
he was preventing the plaintiff from obtaining that to which he
was entitled, refused to act. The agent had the same measure
of control over the relations between his principal and the third
person, though in a different way, as that held by a combination
with power to boycott. And this power of control must not be
exercised intentionally to interfere in the relations between
others, unless there is some affirmative defence. An affirmative
act is not required. A manufacturer who refuses to employ men
who trade at the store of a personal enemy, where the failure to
employ is for the purpose of injuring the enemy, is liable. Upon
the same grounds, an agent who refuses to deal with a particular
person should be liable. 8  Nor is personal ill will necessary;
following the labor cases, it would be enough that there is knowl-
edge that the result would injure "and that there is no justifica-
tion.
7, Note 70, supra. This decision is at least consistent with the hold-
ings of the New York court that an agent in control of tangible property
which e fails to keep in repair is not liable to third persons for injuries
to them.
," 2 E. & B. 216 (1853).
T aThis result was reached in.a peculiar way in Eastin vs. T. & P. Ry.,
99 Tex. 654, 92 S. W. R. 832 (1906), aff. in 100 Tex. 556, 102 S. W. R.
105 (1907), where the agent of a railroad refused to ship the plaintiff's
goods by a short route and was held personally liable. Contra, asmble,
Arnold vs. Moffit, 30 R. I. 310, 75 At. R. 502 (1910)..
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Following the same analogies, it would seem that a neglectful
failure by the agent to perform his duties to his principal would
not give a third person a right of action. Negligence, at present
forms a small part of the law dealing with injuries to pecuniary
interests.7  That its victory will be no less sweeping here than
in case of other interests which have been longer recognized and
more fully protected seems beyond question. We may expect
to find in the future, then, that an agent whose failure to per-
form his principal's business is due to a personal fault (in the
Tort sense) will be liable to a third person whose right to do
business with the principal has been interfered with, where the
agent should have known that the result was probable from his
act or failure to act.
In reviewing the cases and the drawing of legitimate infer-
ences from them, it becomes reasonably clear that the quotation
placed at the beginning of this paper is not correct. As there
is no special rule of agency which relieves an agent, liable
under the ordinary rules of Tort law, from the legal con-
sequences of his transgressions, neither is there a peculiar rule
which causes his liability to be greater. But, by becoming an
agent, one usually does increase responsibility under the rule
that the assumption of control over any situation creates liability
to those whose legally protected interests are injuriously affected
by the faulty exercise of that control, whether the fault lies in
doing or in not doing. As different interests are protected by
law at present in varying degrees, and as there are various rules
of convenience used by the courts in determining causal con-
nection, no categorical rule of liability can be stated. Wherever
the courts have protected interests against neglectful acts, the
77 This explains, in addition to some of those cited, the cases where
a careless abstractor makes a wrong report to his principal upon which
plaintiff relies, and cases of the same general sort. See Mechem, Agency, 2nd.
Ed. §1480.
The American cases allowing recovery against a telegraph company
by the addressee for a negligent failure to transmit a telegram are in ad-
vance of them general legal ruies. It may be that they.are based on the,
theory that the public service duties include a direct obligation to addressee
as distinct from the contractual duty to the senders.
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liability of the agent should depend upon whether he saw or
should have foreseen that by his negligent failure .to perform
his duties he would cause the general kind of damage which in
fact followed his fault, to the class of persons of whom the
plaintiff was one. Where an interest is protected only against
intentional interference, the duty should be limited accord-
ingly.
Aside from all technical legal reasoning, there are eminently
sound practical grounds for reaching this result. A large part
of the world's work is to-day carried on by means of various
agencies. More and more we rely upon the performance of those
who are employees. Our lives, property and enjoyment are in
their hands. The principals are often in distant places. In
many cases if there is no relief against the agent, there is none
at all; in any event the remedy through the principal is a cir-
cumlocution. Going with the extension of the rule of respondeat
superior, based on the power to control, should be a recognition
of the fullest personal and direct responsibility of the agent, the
one in actual control. The statement that "no man increases-
his obligations to strangers by becoming an agent" is not good
in law, sound in justice, -nor satisfying in its economic effects.
